A Crack at Federal Drafting

Joseph Kimble

This will not be the first or last article that criticizes the style of drafting in federal statutes. But it will, I believe, be different in at least one respect: it will scrutinize the style in just one small slice of federal drafting in a way that should edify drafters of any legal document. In fact, this inspection should open the eyes of all legal writers—for I'll identify some of the persistent, inexcusable failings that pervade all legal writing. I did this kind of thing once before in Court Review, using the final orders from the Clinton impeachment trial. If you think those impeachment orders were revealing, wait until you see the USA Patriot Act.

It's amazing, really, how much you can wring out of a few paragraphs. And I'm not talking about subtle or arguable points; I'm talking about the kinds of changes that good stylists or editors would make almost routinely. At the same time, none of the items that I list below are what you would call major. None of them go to the unfriendly format of federal statutes or their overdivided structure. Nor do I get into organization or degree of detail. Nor do I raise the standard complaint about serpentine sentences full of embedded clauses, or even mention the passive voice. Individually, my changes may seem small, but taken as a whole, their effect is considerable. And so it is with writing: clarity does not come in one or two strokes, but through the cumulative effect of many improvements, some of them larger and some smaller.

How did our profession ever arrive at this state of linguistic distress? Apparently, 400 years' worth of legalese has left us blind. We are so used to it that we can't see it for what it is, or can't muster the will to resist, or don't care. The great irony is that most lawyers seem to consider themselves quite proficient at writing and drafting. But as Reed Dickerson, the father of American drafting, observed, "It is a history of wretched writing." So it's not surprising that the habits I criticize have seemingly become ingrained.

At any rate, let me say a word about the paragraphs I'll use from the Patriot Act. I didn't scour the Act for the worst examples. I didn't scour the Act at all. These paragraphs came to my attention because they affect the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which I have an interest in. For the last three years, the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules has been restyling all the criminal rules—a huge undertaking—and I served as a consultant during the last part of the project. The restyled criminal rules were submitted to the Supreme Court last November. At about the same time, Congress passed the Patriot Act, and the advisory committee had to scramble to insert conforming language into the new version of the rules. The Act amended Rules 6(e)(3)(C) and 41(a) of the old rules; the committee inserted the changes into 6(e)(3)(D) and 41(b)(3) of the new rules. I'm going to deal only with the Rule 6 changes because the Rule 41 changes were much shorter.

Now, the committee decided that it had to use the statutory language in the court rules—an understandable decision but a serious setback for good drafting. It's disheartening, after the long effort to improve the rules' clarity and consistency, to see that statutory language imported almost verbatim. And here it is, in all its glory.

THE PARAGRAPHS THAT AFFECT CRIMINAL RULE 6

This is from Title II, section 203(a)(1), of the Patriot Act:

Rule 6(e)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is amended to read as follows:

"(C)(i) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury may also be made—

. . . .

"(V) when the matters involve foreign intelligence or counterintelligence (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)), or foreign intelligence information (as defined in clause (iv) of this subparagraph), to any Federal law enforce-

Footnotes
3. See Bryan A. Garner, President's Letter, THE SCRIVENER (Scribes — Am. Soc'y of Writers on Legal Subjects), Winter 1998, at 1, 3 (noting that, according to the author's informal surveys, 95% of lawyers claim to be good drafters).
ment, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official in order to assist the official receiving that information in the performance of his official duties.

“(iii) Any Federal official to whom information is disclosed pursuant to clause (i)(V) of this subparagraph may use that information only as necessary in the conduct of that person's official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information. Within a reasonable time after such disclosure, an attorney for the government shall file under seal a notice with the court stating the fact that such information was disclosed and the departments, agencies, or entities to which the disclosure was made.

“(iv) In clause (i)(V) of this subparagraph, the term ‘foreign intelligence information’ means—

“(I) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, that relates to the ability of the United States to protect against—

“(aa) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;

“(bb) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or

“(cc) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or

“(II) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to—

“(aa) the national defense or the security of the United States; or

“(bb) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.”

SO WHAT’S THE TROUBLE?

Did those paragraphs seem pretty normal—about par for legal drafting? I suspect they did, so let me try to identify some deficiencies. After each item, I’ll include one or more examples, along with a revised version or a question.

1. An Aversion to Pronouns
   - “acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power”
   
   acts by a foreign power or its agent

   - “the national defense or the security of the United States; or the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States”

   . . . or the conduct of its foreign affairs

2. An Aversion to Possessives
   - “clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power”

   clandestine intelligence activities by a foreign power's intelligence service, intelligence network, or agent

3. An Aversion to -ing Forms (Participles and Gerunds)
   - “in the performance of his official duties”

   in performing his official duties

   - “in the conduct of that person's official duties”

   in conducting [or “to conduct”] that person's official duties

4. An Aversion to Hyphens
   - “foreign intelligence information”

   foreign-intelligence information

   - “Federal law enforcement, . . . national defense, or national security official”

   Federal law-enforcement, . . . national-defense, or national-security official

5. Overuse of “Such,” “That” (as a Demonstrative Adjective), and “Any”
   - “Any [A] Federal official to whom information is disclosed pursuant to clause (i)(V) of this subparagraph may use the information only as necessary in the conduct of that person's official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of the information. Within a reasonable time after disclosure, an attorney for the government shall file under seal a notice with the court stating the fact that the information was disclosed . . . .”

6. Cumbersome and Unnecessary Cross-References
   - “foreign intelligence information (as defined in clause (iv) of this subparagraph)”

   foreign-intelligence information (as defined in (C)(iv))

   - “In clause (i)(V) of this subparagraph, the term ‘foreign intelligence information’ means—”

   “Foreign-intelligence information” means— [There’s no need for the cross-reference, since the earlier
provision, where the term was used, already referred forward to this part.

7. A Tendency Toward Syntactic Ambiguity

- “foreign intelligence or counterintelligence (as defined in . . . 50 U.S.C. 401a)” [Does the parenthetical element modify both items? Yes?]
- “any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official” [How many items does Federal modify? All of them?]
- “activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power” [Does intelligence also modify network?]

8. General Wordiness

- “in order to assist the official receiving that information in the performance of his official duties” for use in performing the official’s duties
- “Any Federal official to whom information is disclosed pursuant to clause (i)(V) of this subparagraph may use that information only as necessary in the conduct of that person’s official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information.”

A federal official who receives information under (C)(i)(V) [or “receives grand-jury information”] may use it only as necessary to perform official duties [and?] subject to any limitations on its unauthorized disclosure.

- “Within a reasonable time after such disclosure, an attorney for the government shall file under seal a notice with the court stating the fact that such information was disclosed and the departments, agencies, or entities to which the disclosure was made.” [But isn’t the disclosure to an official, not an agency?]

Within a reasonable time after disclosure, a government attorney must file, under seal, a notice with the court stating what information was disclosed and to whom [or “stating what information was disclosed, the federal official’s name, and the official’s agency”].

9. General Fuzziness

- “any Federal . . . protective . . . official” [?]
- “a United States person” [?]

10. Needless Repetition

After (C)(i)(V) requires that the disclosure be to assist the official in performing official duties, then (C)(iii) requires that the use be necessary in conducting official duties. I kept both requirements in my redraft below, but I think the first one—concerning the purpose for disclosure—could probably go. Having to file a notice of the disclosure makes it unlikely that someone will disclose for inappropriate reasons.

(Incidentally, why the switch in these two provisions from in the performance of (official duties) to in the conduct of? What possible difference is there? Probably none, but the switch creates a hint of contextual ambiguity.)

A REDRAFT

I’ll leave it to you to decide whether the original or the following redraft is better. Just two comments: the only part I reorganized is (C)(iv); and if I inadvertently changed a meaning somewhere, it can easily be restored without reverting to the style of the original. All right, then:

Rule 6(e)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is amended to read as follows:

(C)(i) Disclosure of a grand-jury matter may also be made:

. . .

(V) to a federal official who is engaged in law enforcement, intelligence, protection [?], immigration, national defense, or national security, if the matter involves foreign intelligence or counterintelligence (as they are defined in 50 U.S.C. 401a) or foreign-intelligence information (as defined in (C)(iv)) and if the information is for use in performing the official’s duties.

. . .

(iii) A federal official who receives grand-jury information may use it only as necessary to perform [his or her?] official duties and subject to any limitations on its unauthorized disclosure. Within a reasonable time after disclosure, a government attorney must file, under seal, a notice with the court stating what information was disclosed and to whom.

(iv) “Foreign-intelligence information” means any information about a person, a foreign power, or a foreign territory that relates to the national defense or the security of the United States, or to the conduct of its foreign affairs. The term includes any information about:

(I) the ability of the United States to protect against actual attack, potential attack, sabotage, international terrorism, or other grave hostile act by a foreign power or its agent; or
(II) clandestine intelligence activities by a foreign power's intelligence service, intelligence net-
work, or agent.

CONCLUSION

Lawyers draft poorly. And for that to change, several related things must happen.

First, their loyal critics must keep complaining, keep agitating; I'll do my best, as a public service.

Second, reformers must keep exposing the myths about writing clearly, in plain language—like the myth that plain language is not precise, or is just about simple words and short sentences, or is not supported by any hard evidence of its effect-

Third, to overcome resistance and doubt, reformers must keep pointing to major advancements—like the restyled Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, new article 9 of the UCC, and some of the work done by the Securities and Exchange Commission in the late 1990s. The drafting in these projects may not be perfect, but compare it with what went before.

Fourth, lawyers must stop making excuses for traditional legal style and stop aping old models. This will require, to begin with, some humility and open-mindedness, and then a close encounter with some books on legal writing or a CLE course or a good editor. Like any skill, writing well takes sustained effort; it's not innate.

Finally, law schools must end their shameful neglect of legal drafting. Although many schools have strengthened their writing programs in the last decade, those programs concentrate mainly on briefs and memos, not on drafting (contracts, wills, bylaws, statutes, rules). True, most schools do offer an elective in legal drafting, but only a very small number—maybe 10 or 15 schools—require it as a substantial part of their writing pro-
grams. It's no wonder, then, that most lawyers, steeped as they are in old forms and models, consider themselves good drafters. Nobody has ever showed them a better way.

Joseph Kimble graduated from Amherst College and the University of Michigan Law School. He is a professor at Thomas Cooley Law School, where he has taught legal writing for 18 years. He is the editor of the “Plain Language” column in the Michigan Bar Journal, the editor in chief of The Scribes Journal of Legal Writing, and the drafting consultant to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States. You can contact him at kimblej@cooley.edu.

